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It's going to take all of us to gather the necessary intelligence, the
necessary information, to be able to find the location of the ter-
rorists; to work with governments to smoke them out of their safe
houses, to get them moving, and then have the courage to bring
them to justice.'
President George W. Bush, September 18, 2001
I. INTRODUCTION
The devastating events of September 11, 2001, have
brought home the reality that a shadowy, global network of ex-
tremists threatens the peace and security of our nation.2 This
threat, however, is not new, as U.S. interests have long been the
targets of international terrorism. 3 The attacks have exposed
our vulnerabilities, 4 and at the same time have generated enor-
mous patriotism, which has immeasurably strengthened our re-
1 President Chirac Pledges Support, Remarks by President Bush and Presi-
dent Chirac of France in Photo Opportunity (Sept. 18, 2001), at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2001/09/2001091 8 -8.html.
2 See Global Threats and Challenges: Hearing Before the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Comm., 107th Cong. 2 (2002) (statement of Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson,
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency) [hereinafter Wilson Statement].
3 In February 1993, a massive bomb destroyed the parking garage at the
World Trade Center in New York City. In June 1996, a powerful bomb destroyed
Khobar Towers, a U.S. military housing complex in Saudi Arabia. In August 1998
there were simultaneous vehicular bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Ke-
nya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. In October 2000, a boat laden with explosives
was detonated alongside the U.S.S. Cole while refueling in the Yemini port of
Aden. See generally KENNETH KATZMAN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, TERRORISM:
NEAR EASTERN GROUPS AND STATE SPONSORS (Sept. 10, 2001).
4 See Wilson Statement, supra note 2, at 2-3. See also Converging Dangers in
a Post 9/11 World: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th
Cong. (2002) (statement of George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence) [herein-
after Tenet Statement]; Mathew Wald, A Nation Challenged: Electric Power Sys-
tem is Called Vulnerable and Vigilance is Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2002, at
A13 (stating computers and security systems that control electric power around
the nation have been probed by terrorists); William Broad, A Nation Challenged:
Analyzing Dangers; Scientists Find the New Field of Threat Assessment Full of
Uncertainties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at B8 (stating scientists using a new
threat assessment technique face uncertainties predicting likelihood of future ter-
rorists attacks).
[Vol. 14:435436
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/7
2002] INTERNATIONAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY 437
solve. 5 While the military strikes of Operation Enduring
Freedom,6 and the arrests or detention of terror suspects
throughout the world have significantly disrupted Usama bin
Laden's Al Qaeda network,7 the most recent intelligence reports
suggest that bin Laden is still alive,8 and hiding in the moun-
5 See Wilson Statement, supra note 2, at 3. See also RAPHAEL F. PERL, CRS
ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, TERRORISM, THE FUTURE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
(Sept. 2001) [hereinafter PERL].
6 See generally THE U.S. ARMY, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, at http:ll
www.army.mil/enduringfreedom/default.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
7 See generally Somalis Arrest Terror Suspect, BBC NEWS, Sept. 21, 2001, at
http://news.bbc.co/uk/hi/world/africa/1723186.stm, Spain Arrests Six Terror Sus-
pects, BBC NEWS, Sept. 26, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co/uk/hi/world/europe/
1564341.stm; Who is Richard Reid?, BBC NEWS, Dec. 28, 2001, at http://
news.bbc.co/ukl1/low/uk/1731568.stm; John Tagliabue, A Nation Challenged: The
Suspects; Arrests in Belgium Highlight Its Role as a Militants' Base, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2001, at B5; Singapore Arrests Terror Suspects, BBC NEWS, Jan. 5, 2002,
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid 1743000/1743981.
stm; A Nation Challenged: Suspects; 6 Tied to Terror Are Given to U.S. by Bosnia,
Despite Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at A8; Philip Shenon, A Nation
Challenged; U.S. Labels an Arab Captive A Planner of Qaeda Attacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2002, at A8; James Risen, A Nation Challenged: The Threat; Qaeda Still
Able To Strike U.S., Head of CIA Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at Al; Ian Fisher,
A Nation Challenged: The Balkins: Details of a Terrorist Plot Still Cloaked in Con-
fusion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at A15; James Risen & Philip Shenon, U.S. Says
It Halted Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at A28;
Steven Erlanger, Germans Say Figure Linked to Sept. 11 is in Syria Jail, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2002, at A8; Douglas Frantz, German Police Quiz Roommate of
Top Hijacker, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2002, at Al; South-East Asia's Terror
Clampdown, BBC NEWS, July 12, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/ameri-
cas/2196451.stm; Danny Hakim, 4 Are Charged With Belonging To a Terror Cell,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2002, at Al; Melissa Eddy, Germans Arrest Pair in Bomb
Plot, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 7, 2002, at Al; Raymond Bonner, Plan to Attack
Embassies Cited, U.S. Says Qaeda Member Told of Threat to Offices in Asia, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at Al; John F. Burns, Qaeda Remnants Hunted Along Paki-
stan Border, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at A23; Italian Police Arrest Terror Sus-
pects, BBC NEWS, Sept. 12, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.ukI2/hi/worldleurope/
2253097.stm; Raymond Bonner, Singapore Announces Arrests of2l Men Linked to
Planned Attacks on U.S. Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at A17; Philip She-
non, 6 Suspects Charged Under Broadly Worded Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at
A17; John Kifner & Marc Santora, U.S. Names 7th Man in Qaeda Cell Near Buf-
falo and Calls His Role Pivotal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at A19; John F. Burns,
Afghans Intercept Fuel Truck Aimed at U.S. -Run Air Base, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2002, at A19.
8 See Associated Press, Senator: Intelligence Indicates bin Laden Still Alive,
USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 2001, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/attack/2001/12/31/
binladen-alive.htm; see also Bin Laden 'on TV Soon', BBC NEWS, June 23, 2002, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/southg-asia/2060561.stm.
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tains somewhere between Mghanistan and Pakistan. 9 "Regard-
less if Usama is killed or survives, the awakening has
started,"10 and undoubtedly, his network still remains a
threat. 1
Al Qaeda's objective is clear, and has been espoused by
Usama bin Laden - who has "urged and incited his followers to
kill American citizens, in the most unequivocal terms."12 As
early as 1996, bin Laden declared it "the duty now on every
tribe in the Arabian peninsula to . . .cleanse the land from
these Crusader occupiers,"' 3 and in 1998, he asserted that "the
killing of Americans and their civilian and military allies is a
religious duty for each and every Muslim to be carried out in
whichever country they are .... ,,14 Later that same year, bin
Laden proclaimed it a "religious duty" to acquire weapons of
mass destruction to use against the United States. 15 Since that
time, ninety-percent-enriched weapons-grade uranium in an
amount sufficient to produce an atomic bomb has been reported
9 See supra note 7, and accompanying text.
10 First War of the Century (A1-Jazirah television broadcast, Dec. 27, 2001)
(statement by Usama bin Laden) (translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service) (transcript on file with author).
11 See generally America's 'Most Wanted Terrorists', BBC NEWS, Oct. 10, 2001,
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/americas/1591997.stm; Risen, supra note 7;
Statement of Defense Official, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Background Briefing on the
Al Qaeda Terrorist Network (Feb. 19, 2002), at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/
alqaeda-dod02l902.html; James Dao, Taliban and Al Qaeda Believed Plotting
Within Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2002, at Al; Howard W. French, Pakistani
Intelligence Officials See Qaeda Peril in Their Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2002, at
A8; Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Official Warns Asians to Guard Against Terror, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 2002, at A6; Belinda Rhodes, Al Qaeda's Continuing Threat, BBC
NEWS, Mar. 11, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/americas/19999054.stm;
US 'Faces Suicide Bomb Threat', BBC NEWS, May 20, 2002, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/1999054.stm; James Risen & Dexter Filkens,
Qaeda Fighters Said to Return to Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at Al;
Al Qaeda Planning Attacks, BBC NEWS, Sept. 11, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/world/americas/2249797; Raymond Bonner, Plan to Attack Embassies Cited,
U.S. Says Qaeda Member Told of Threat to Offices in Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2002, at Al.
12 OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, UK REPORT ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS, para. 21 (Oct. 4, 2001), http://www.fas.org/irp/
news/2001/10/ukreport.html.
13 Id. para. 22.
14 Id. (emphasis added).
15 See Tenet Statement, supra note 4.
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stolen from an enterprise in the former Soviet Union. 16 After
the attacks of September 11, 2001, bin Laden boasted to a
Pakistani newspaper that "Al-Qaeda [now] possess[ed] chemical
and nuclear weapons,"1 7 and was prepared to use them if
necessary.18
Today, "experts agree that the most effective way to fight
[international] terrorism is to gather as much intelligence as
possible," 19 in order to prevent future attacks before they can be
executed. 20 In simple terms, intelligence gathering "gives us an
information advantage over our adversaries,"21 and in the wake
of September 11, 2001, "[tlhe collection and analysis of... intel-
ligence and information has become a priority of the highest
measure. '22 Since intelligence gathering will be "the front line
in the war against [international] terrorism,"23 the new empha-
sis of the United States Intelligence Community 24 will un-
doubtedly be on the interception and analysis of foreign
communications. 25
16 See NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND MILITARY FORCES (Feb.
2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/icarussiansecurity.htm.
17 Bin Laden 'Has Nuclear Weapons', BBC NEws, Nov. 10, 2001, at http:ll
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/south-asia/1648572.stm. See also Hamid Mir, Osama
Claims He Has Nukes: If US Uses N-Arms It Will Get Same Response, DAWN THE
INTERNET EDITION, Nov. 9, 2001, at http://www.dawn.com/2001/11/10/topl.htm.
18 See id.
19 PERL, supra note 5, at 4.
20 See id.
21 Mike Hayden, Director of the National Security Agency (N.S.A.), Opening
Remarks: Partnerships for Combating Terrorism Forum (Mar. 4, 2002).
22 OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SE-
CURITY 17 (2002).
23 Shelley Davis, Piecing It Together, THE RETIRED OFFICER MAGAZINE, at
http://www.troa.org/Magazine/June2002/f piecing.asp (last visited June 12, 2002).
24 "The term 'Intelligence Community' refers to the group of fourteen govern-
ment agencies and organizations that, either in whole or in part, conduct the intel-
ligence of the United States Government: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);
Department of the Treasury; Department of Energy; Department of State; Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA); Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.); National Im-
agery and Mapping Agency (NIMA); National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); Na-
tional Security Agency (N.S.A.); U.S. Air Force Intelligence; U.S. Army
Intelligence; U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence; U.S. Navy Intelligence; and U.S.
Marine Corps Intelligence." Joint Investigation into September 11th: First Public
Hearing Before Joint House/Senate Intelligence, Comm. Hearing, 107th Cong.
(2002) (statement by Eleanor Hill, Staff Directory, Joint Inquiry Staff) [hereinafter
Hill Statement].
25 See Davis, supra note 23.
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Al Qaeda operatives are trained well to protect their sensi-
tive communications,26 and "even against a superior arsenal of
technology, there are still plenty of ways for terrorists to avoid
detection. '27 Intelligence analysts now believe that Usama bin
Laden has "morphed his terrorist tactics to keep pace with U.S.
intelligence-gathering methods,"28 and that future attacks will
likely be planned using both high and low-tech means. 29 Still,
others believe that in order to elude law enforcement, "bin
Laden has ditched his satellite-linked phones, mobile handsets
and Internet access in favor of 'Stone Age' messaging tech-
niques .... ."30 Despite their preferred means of communication,
"Al Qaeda cells .. .will continue to pose a threat to U.S. and
other western interests."31
In order to get a first-hand look at how the U.S. Intelligence
Community is being primed to prevent future terrorist at-
tacks, 32 President George W. Bush recently visited the head-
quarters of the National Security Agency (N.S.A.). 33 Since
26 See AL QAEDA TRAINING MANUAL, FIFTH LESSON: MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
AND TRANSPORTATION, at http://www.fas.org.irp/worl/para/manuelpartl.html (last
visited June 12, 2002).
27 Susan Stellin, Terror's Confounding Online Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
2002, at G1.
28 Daniel Sieberg, Bin Laden Exploits Technology to Suit his Needs,
CNN.coM, Sept. 21, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001fUS/09/20/inv.terrorist.
search/index.html.
29 See id.
30 Id.
31 The Terrorist Threat Confronting the United States: Hearing Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement by Dale L.
Watson, Executive Assistant Director, Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence,
Federal Bureau of Investigation), http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/020602
watson.html.
32 See Press Release, National Security Agency Central Security Service,
President George W. Bush Visits the N.S.A. Commends On 50 Years of Cryptologic
Service to the Nation Personally Thanks Work Force For Its Efforts in the War
Against Terrorism (June 4, 2002), at http://www.nsa.gov/releases/20020604.htm
[hereinafter N.S.A. Press Release].
33 The N.S.A. is a secretive, "separately organized agency within the Depart-
ment of Defense . . . [that] employs the country's premier codemakers and
codebreakers." Statement for the Record: Hearing on Critical Skills for National
Security and the Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act Before the Governmen-
tal Affairs Subcommittee on Int'l Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services,
107th Cong. (Mar. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Hearing on Critical Skills]. See id.
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1952, 34 the N.S.A. has conducted "electronic surveillance to col-
lect foreign intelligence... ,,35 and today, is rumored "to have
more computing power than any other institution on earth
..... 36 The "N.S.A.'s mission is to exploit secret foreign com-
munications and produce foreign intelligence information while
protecting U.S. communications."37 "The N.S.A. provides valua-
ble intelligence [information] . . . on a wide range of issues of
concern to all Americans, such as international terrorism, nar-
cotics trafficking, and [the] proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction."38
From 1996 to 1998, "when bin Laden was beginning his op-
erations out of Afghanistan, [the] N.S.A. knew his phone rfum-
ber and was able to listen in on calls he and his top lieutenants
made to Al Qaeda cells around the world."39 Despite U.S. sur-
veillance activity, N.S.A. intercepts could not prevent bin Laden
from orchestrating the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in
East Africa. 40 Similarly, the conversations intercepted on the
day before September 11, 2001,41 could not prevent nineteen Al
Qaeda operatives from hijacking four commercial airliners and
subsequently crashing the planes into the World Trade Center,
the Pentagon, and an empty field in Stony Creek Township,
Pennsylvania. As a result, this massive failure of intelligence
34 See generally NAT'L SECURITY COUNCIL, INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE No. 9:
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 29, 1952) (stating that the N.S.A. controlled
intelligence activities against foreign governments since 1952).
35 Statement for the Record: Hearing on the Regulation and Oversight of the
National Security Agency's Electronic Surveillance Activities Before the House Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence, 105th Cong. (Apr. 12, 2002) (statement of
N.S.A. Director L.T. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, USAF) [hereinafter Hayden
Statement].
36 James Risen & David Johnston, Agency Is Under Scrutiny for Overlooked
Messages, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at Al.
37 Hearing on Critical Skills, supra note 33. See also Exec. Order No. 12333,
46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
38 Hayden Statement, supra note 35.
39 60 Minutes: National Security Meltdown (CBS television broadcast, June
19, 2002) (transcript on file with PACE INT'L L. REV.).
40 See id.
41 On September 10, 2001, N.S.A. intercepts caught Al Qaeda operatives
boasting in Arabic that "The match begins tomorrow" and "Tomorrow is Zero
Hour." See John Diamond & Kathy Kiely, Heard 9/10: Tomorrow is Zero Hour,
USA TODAY, June 19, 2002, at Al. See also John Tagliabue, Cryptic Tapes From
2000 Hinted at Air Attack in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2002, at Al.
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"became the focus of an eight-hour closed door hearing on Capi-
tal-Hill."42
The N.S.A.'s vast computing powers and interception capa-
bilities cannot be expected to prevent each and every terrorist
attack; however, the use of interception technologies will un-
doubtedly play a critical role in fighting the war against inter-
national terrorism.43 Although intelligence gathering services,
such as the N.S.A., provide citizens valuable services in "pro-
tecting national security and the free order of a democratic
state,"44 after the devastation of September 11, 2001, Europe-
ans have become increasingly concerned that governments are
putting the interests of national security above the respect for
individual fundamental rights.45 This concern is justified given
that national security services often have inadequate control
measures, and "there is a high risk of abuse of power and viola-
tions of human rights, unless legislative and constitutional
safeguards are provided."4 6 Following the attacks, European
privacy and civil liberties organizations from Austria, Den-
mark, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
42 Bill Gertz, For Years, Signs Suggested 'That Something Was Up,' WASH.
TIMES, May 17, 2002, at Al. See also Kevin Anderson, US Intelligence Efforts
Fractured, BBC NEWS, May 18, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/19947
10.stm; Nicholas M. Horrock, Bush: 9/11 Questions Persist, WASH. TIMES, May 19,
2002, at http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/19052002-051817-3684r.htm;
Diamond & Kiely, supra note 41; James Risen, Qaeda Attack Was in Works for 3
Years, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2002, at A18; Threats and Responses: A
Reaction to Sept. 11: 'This is a Massive Failure of Intelligence', N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 2002, at A18; James Risen, White House Drags its Feet on Testifying at 9/11
Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2002, at A12; Hill Statement, supra note 24; James
Risen, U.S. Failed to Act on Warnings in '98 of a Plane Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 2002, at A6; Part II.A., infra.
43 See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTA-
TION, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess., REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN THE WAR ON
TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY: THE ROLE OF OTA 107-61 (Comm. Print
2002), available at http://fas.orglirp/congress/2002_hr/ota.html. See also US Los-
ing Hi-Tech Spying Race, BBC NEWS, Aug. 15, 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
sci/tech/1491102.stm.
44 Recommendation 1402; Control of Internal Security Services in Council of
Europe, EUR. PARL. ASS. DEB. 9th Sess. Doc. No. 8301, para. 3 (Apr. 26, 1999)
[hereinafter Recommendation].
45 See Joris Evers, Euro Civil Liberty Campaigners Urge Restraint, CNN.coM,
Nov. 4, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECI-Iindustry/11/04/civil.liberties.idg/
index.html.
46 Recommendation, supra note 44, para. 2.
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have urged the Council of Europe to defend the fundamental
rights and freedoms of Europeans. 47
In the wake of September 11, 2001, this note explores the
inherent tensions existing between the right of a democratic so-
ciety to national security and the individual right to privacy in
Europe. By focusing on fundamental rights guaranteed to Eu-
ropean citizens via international instruments, this note exam-
ines how the right to privacy in Europe will be affected by post-
September 11th, foreign intelligence gathering activity.
Whether under the auspices of the United Kingdom-United
States Security Agreement ("UKUSA") Agreement,4 8 advanced
international surveillance systems, such as Echelon, can be uti-
lized effectively in a way that is compatible with European law
and the fundamental right to privacy.
II. COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE & THE UNITED KINGDOM-
UNITED STATES SECURITY AGREEMENT
Communications intelligence ("COMINT")49 is practiced by
virtually all developed countries throughout the world in order
47 See Evers, supra note 45.
48 UKUSA refers to a secret 1948 agreement on Signals Intelligence between
the National Security Agency (N.S.A.), the Government Communications Head
Quarters (GCHQ) of England, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
of Canada, the Australian Defense Security Directorate (DSD), and the General
Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) of New Zealand. See infra, notes 50-70
and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of UKUSA.
49 "'Communications Intelligence' is intelligence produced by the study of for-
eign communications. Intelligence based in whole or in part on Communications
Intelligence sources shall be considered Communications Intelligence as pertains
to the authority and responsibility of the United States Communications Intelli-
gence Board." NAT'L SECURITY COUNCIL, DEP'T OF STATE, NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE No. 9 (Mar. 10, 1950), available at http:/!
www.fas.orglirp/offdocs/nscid09.htm. "'[C]ommunications intelligence' or
'COMINT' shall be construed to mean all procedures and methods used in the in-
terception of communications other than foreign press and propaganda broadcasts
and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the in-
tended recipients,. " Unpublished Memorandum from President Harry S. Tru-
man to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, Communications
Intelligence Activities (Oct. 24, 1952), at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/nsa/publi-
cations/ic/icdocl.html. "COMINT is technical and intelligence information derived
from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. COMINT is
produced by the collection and processing of foreign communications passed by
electromagnetic means,.... and by the processing of foreign encrypted communica-
tions, however transmitted." DEP'T OF DEFENSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
AND THE CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE S-
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"to obtain sensitive data concerning individuals, government,
trade and international organisations."50 Traditionally associ-
ated with the interception of military and diplomatic communi-
cations,5 1 over the past half-century, COMINT has become "a
large-scale industrial activity" providing consumers with intelli-
gence on economic and scientific developments as well. 52
Following World War II, a secret international agreement
known as the United Kingdom-United States Security Agree-
ment ("UKUSA" or the "Agreement"), was made.53 Formalized
in 1948, this clandestine accord effectively fashioned the first
cooperative alliance between international intelligence gather-
ing agencies. 54 For more than a half-century, signatories to the
UKUSA Agreement have worked together to intercept, analyze,
and disseminate COMINT from the world's communications
channels. 55 Since "[the] UKUSA Agreement is a tiered treaty in
which the U.S. is designated as the First Party ... the United
States (and specifically the N.S.A.) is recognized as the domi-
nant party."56 While its signatories still refuse to officially ac-
knowledge its existence, the Agreement is explicitly referred to
5100.20 (Dec. 23, 1971) (last modified Feb. 8, 1973), available at http://www.fas.
org/irp/offdocs/nscid09.htm. See also NAT'L SECURITY COUNCIL, SIGNALS INTELLI-
GENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE No. 6 (Feb. 17,
1972), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/05-01.
htm.
50 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS ASSESSMENT PANEL, EUR. PARL,
DEVELOPMENT OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY AND RISK OF ABUSE OF ECONOMIC
INFORMATION: PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT
OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY]; SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS ASSESS-
MENT PANEL, EUR. PARL., DEVELOPMENT OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY AND RISK
OF ABUSE OF ECONOMIC INFORMATION (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter STOA], http:l/
www.iptvreports.mcmail.com/ic2kreport.htm.
51 See STOA, supra note 50.
52 See id.
53 See generally JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE, INSIDE THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY, AMERICA'S MOST SECRET INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (1983);
JEFFERY T. RICHELSON & DESMOND BALL, THE TIE THAT BINDS (1985); Nickey Ha-
ger, Secret Power (1996); Patrick S. Poole, Echelon: America's Secret Global Sur-
veillance Network (1999/2000), at http://fly.hiwaay.net/-pspoole/echelon.html.
54 See STOA, supra note 50.
55 See Duncan Campbell, Paper 1: Echelon and its Role in COMINT, TELE-
POLIS, May 27, 2001, para 15-17, at http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/specialIech/
7747/l.html.
56 RICHELSON & BALL, supra note 53, at 7.
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in a U.K. Parliamentary monitoring body report 57 and has been
recognized by both the Prime Minister of New Zealand 58 and
the former director of the Australian intelligence service
[DSD] .59
Prior to 1990, "it is widely accepted that the primary func-
tion of the U.S. intelligence system, usually working in close co-
operation with western European allies, was to gather intelli-
gence of all types on the former Soviet Union, its allies, and on
the Peoples Republic of China."60 The fall of communism in the
Soviet Union, however, "brought about dramatic changes inside
all western intelligence agencies,"61 and with its principle tar-
get suddenly gone, "intelligence agencies faced a period of down-
sizing .... ,,62 Over the next decade, "the N.S.A. lost about 15%
of its budget, 20% of its staff, and closed more than 20 overseas
field stations."63
After the Cold War, the U.S. Intelligence Community
shifted its focus to the collection of economic intelligence, scien-
tific and technological development, narcotics trafficking,
money laundering, organized crime, and international terror-
ism. 64 It quickly became apparent that international coopera-
57 See INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITrEE, ANNUAL REPORT, 1999-2000,
Cm. 4897, para. 14, available at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/docu-
ment/cm48/4897/4897-02.htm#gen76. See also Report on the Existence of A Global
System For the Interception of Private and Commercial Communications (ECHE-
LON) Interception System, EuR. PARL. DoC. (A5-0264/2001) 59 (2001) [hereinafter
Parliament Report on ECHELON].
58 Noting "[the operation of the GCSB is directed solely by the New Zealand
Government. It is, however, a member of a long-standing collaborative interna-
tional partnership for the exchange of foreign intelligence and the sharing of
communications security technology." DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL SECURITY SECRETA-
RIAT, DEP'T OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET OF NEW ZEALAND, SECURING OUR
NATION'S SAFETY, How NEW ZEALAND MANAGES ITS SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES 27 (2000), http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dess/securingoursafety/sons2000.
pdf. See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 61.
59 See Letter from Martin Brady, Director of DSD, to Ross Coulthart, Re-
porter, Nine Network Australia (Mar. 16, 1999), at http://www.igis.gov.au/annuals/
1998_99/annex2.html. See also Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57,
at 62.
60 Duncan Campbell, Paper 2: COMINT Impact on International Trade, TELE-
POLIS, May 27, 2001, para. 3, at http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/special/ech/7752/
1.html.
61 Id. para. 4.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See id.
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tion among intelligence services was the most effective means of
battling these more contemporary global problems. 65 Following
September 11, 2001, the sharing of COMINT data between the
UKUSA signatories will undoubtedly focus primarily on fight-
ing the war against international terrorism.
Just days before the 2001 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence (SSCI) reaffirmed its commitment to revitalizing the
N.S.A. by approving the Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year
2002.66 This allocation of funds represented "the first install-
ment of a multi-year effort to correct serious deficiencies that
have developed over the past decade in the Intelligence Commu-
nity."67 Despite its multi-billion dollar-a-year budget, the U.S.
Intelligence Community, and the N.S.A. in particular, still "lack
the personnel to instantly translate and analyze the high vol-
ume of information it collects each day from around the world
.... 6 Since the September 11th attacks the U.S. Congress
approved the President Bush's request for $20 billion in addi-
tional funds to combat international terrorism,69 and the "intel-
ligence agencies have experienced a surge in job seekers ....
R6sum~s are pouring in... at a rate four to six times as high as
before the attacks." 70
A. September 11th - A Failure of Intelligence
During the months and even years before the attacks of
September 11, 2001, the U.S. Intelligence Community and the
Bush administration had clear warnings that terrorist organi-
zations, including Al Qaeda were planning to attack targets in
65 See id.
66 See Press Release, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence Authorizes Intelligence Spending for Fiscal Year
2002 (Sept. 6, 2001), available at http://www.fas.orgsgp/news/2001/09/ssci_01090
6.html.
67 Id.
68 John Diamond & Kathy Kiely, Heard 9/10: 'Tomorrow is Zero Hour,' USA
TODAY, June 19, 2002, at Al.
69 See US. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMBATING TERRORISM: SELECTED
CHALLENGES AND RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS (Sept. 2001).
70 Eric Schmitt, A Nation Challenged: The Intelligence Agencies; Job Seekers
Flood Spy Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at B7.
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the U.S. using aircraft. 71 National Security Advisor, Con-
doleezza Rice, maintained that the intelligence reports given to
the President in the months prior to the attacks suggested only
that "traditional hijackings" were being anticipated, 72 and that
the impending attacks were thought likely to be directed at
targets outside the U.S.73 "Both in terms of attempts and ac-
tual attacks, [however,] there was considerable historical evi-
dence prior to September 11, that international terrorists had
planned and were, in fact, capable of conducting major terrorist
strikes within the United States."74
The Intelligence Community also possessed ample evidence
prior to September 11, 2001, which indicated that terrorists
were contemplating the use of airplanes as weapons. 75 Specifi-
cally, the Community obtained information in August 1998
"that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-
laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade
Center. '76 In response to this recent disclosure, "intelligence of-
ficials reacted angrily, declaring that the panel had exaggerated
some material and taken information out of context so the 1998
threat appeared to mirror the Sept. 11 attacks."77
71 See Hill Statement, supra note 24, at 26-30. See also Gertz, supra note 42;
David E. Sanger, Bush Was Warned Bin Laden Wanted To Hijack Planes, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2002, at Al; Philip Shenon, F.B.I. Knew for Years About Terror
Pilot Training, Bureau Failed to Share Its Finding, and to Connect the Dots, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 2002, at Al; David Johnston, Ashcroft Learned of Agent's Alert Just
After 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2002, at Al.
72 See Gertz, supra note 42. See also David Corn, The bin Laden Warnings:
Why Did Bush Keep It a Secret? THE NATION, May 16, 2002, at http://www.thena-
tion.com/capitalgames/index.mhtml?bid=3#pid=60.
73 See Gertz, supra note 42.
74 Hill Statement, supra note 24, at 9. "The 1993 attack on the World Trade
Center, the subsequent discovery in 1993 of plots to bomb New York City
landmarks, and the arrests in 1999 during the Millennium celebrations of an indi-
vidual with al Qa'ida connections intending to bomb Los Angeles International
Airport should have erased any doubts, to the extent they existed, about that
point." Id.
75 See id. at 26-30. See also James Risen, U.S. Failed to Act on Warnings in
'98 of a Plane Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at A6.
76 Hill Statement, supra note 24, at 27. See also 9/11 Inquiry Reveals WTC
Threat in 1998, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/
news/nows-attack-intelligence.html; Report Cites Warnings Before 9/11, CNN.
COM, Sept. 18, 2002, at http://cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/18/intelligence.
hearings/index.html.
77 James Risen, Intelligence Officials Discount '98 Report From Caribbean of
Plot to Hit Trade Center, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2002, at A14.
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Apparently, it was not until the 1998 embassy bombings in
East Africa that the Intelligence Community finally recognized
how dangerous a threat Al Qaeda was to U.S. interests. 78
In December 1998, the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence]
George Tenet provided written guidance to his deputies at the
CIA, declaring, in effect, "war" with Bin Laden. DCI Tenet wrote:
We must now enter a new phase in our effort against Bin Laden
.... We are at war .... I want no resources or people spared in
this effort, either inside [the] CIA or the [Intelligence]
Community. 79
Despite that declaration of war, however, "there was no massive
shift in budget or reassignment of personnel to counterterror-
ism until after September 11, 2001." s0 In fact, the "1998 decla-
ration did not adequately reflect a true 'war' effort against bin
Laden."81 In 1999, after the so-called "declaration of war," the
DCI's Counterterrorist Center ("CTC") only had "three analysts
assigned full-time to Bin Laden's terrorist network worldwide
. .. [and] [o]n September 11, 2001, the international analytic
unit at F.B.I. headquarters had in place only one analyst to ad-
dress al Qa'ida."8 2
Concerns about Usama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda net-
work grew over the next few years, "and reached peak levels in
the spring and summer of 2001, as the Intelligence Community
faced increasing numbers of reports of imminent al-Qa'ida at-
tacks against U.S. interests." 3 The "chatter" of impending at-
tacks was so great between May and July 2001,84 "that the
National Security Agency reported at least 33 communications
indicating a possible, imminent terrorist attack."85 As a result
of these reports, on August 6, 2001, President Bush received a
daily briefing entitled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in the
78 See Hill Statement, supra note 24, at 9.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 10.
81 Id. at 18.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 10.
84 See Nicholas M. Horrock, Bush: 9/11 Questions Persist, WASH. TIMES, May
19, 2002, at http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/19052002-051817-3684r.htm.
See also Julian Borger, U.S. Asks: Just What Did Bush Know?, GUARDIAN UNLIM-
ITED, May 17, 2002, at http://guardian.co.uk/septemberl1/story/0,11209,717179,00.
html.
85 Hill Statement, supra note 24, at 20.
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U.S.," which forewarned of an imminent Al Qaeda attack, that
planes were likely going to be hijacked, and that buildings in
New York City were of particular concern.8 6 Despite these in-
telligence reports, "authorities did little to 'harden the home-
land' against an assault." 7
B. The Three Warning Flags
In July and August 2001, just about the time when the rise
in intelligence 'chatter' began to decrease, "three additional de-
velopments occurred in the United States"8 8 that should have
raised warning flags: "the Phoenix memo; the detention of
Zacarias Moussaoui; and the Intelligence Community's realiza-
tion that two individuals with ties to Usama Bin Ladin's net-
work . . . were possibly in the United States."8 9 Apparently,
however, "[t]he Intelligence Community [..] had not connected
these individual warning flags to each other, to the 'drumbeat'
of threat reporting that had just occurred, or to the urgency of
the 'war' effort . "90 which had been declared three years
earlier.
The first warning flag was raised in July 2001, when the so-
called "Phoenix Memo" was sent from the F.B.I.'s field office in
Phoenix, Arizona, to a unit within F.B.I. headquarters in Wash-
ington, D.C., alerting them "that several Arabs were seeking
flight training and other courses involving airport security and
airport operations at at least one U.S. flight school."91 The five-
page memo written by Agent Kenneth Williams, requested that
F.B.I. headquarters "order a check of all flight schools to look
for other Arabs who might also be involved,"92 and explicitly re-
ferred to Usama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network. 93 Agent
Williams' recommendation, however, was turned down by F.B.I.
headquarters in Washington, 94 and to compound this failure,
86 See Gertz, supra note 42. See also Horrock, supra note 84.
87 Congress Opens Investigation of Sept. 11 Attacks to Public, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2002, at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Attacks-Intelli-
gence.html.
88 Hill Statement, supra note 24, at 10.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Gertz, supra note 42.
92 Id.
93 See id. See also Borger, supra note 84.
94 See Borger, supra note 84.
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they "basically kept this [information] in," and did not share it
with the rest of the Community.95
The second warning flag was raised on August 16, 2001,
when the F.B.I. arrested Zacarias Moussaoui on immigration
charges after flight instructors at the Pan Am International
Flying Academy in Eagan, Minnesota, grew suspicious when he
"paid $8,000 to learn how to fly a commercial jetliner but had
expressed disinterest in learning to take off and land."96 After
his arrest, F.B.I. agents in the Minnesota "field office wanted
headquarters to press for a warrant to allow them to search the
computer owned by Mr. Moussaoui,"97 but were stifled by F.B.I.
headquarters in Washington.98  When the F.B.I. finally
searched Mr. Moussaoui's computer after September 11th, they
discovered "cockpit layouts of large commercial aircraft, and
phone numbers like one in Germany for the roommate of
Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the plot."99
A "veteran agent and general counsel in the Minneapolis
[field] office," 100 Colleen Rowley, later criticized F.B.I. head-
quarters for blocking "attempts by Minneapolis agents to obtain
a warrant to examine Mr. Moussaoui's laptop computer."10 1 In
response to Ms. Rowley's criticisms,10 2 F.B.I. Director Robert S.
Mueller III agreed that "the Minneapolis and Phoenix situa-
tions should have been handled differently,"10 3 and that Agent
Williams' Phoenix Memo "should have been shared with the
CIA."10 4 Mr. Mueller also acknowledged that even though the
"Moussaui information and the Phoenix memo went to the same
unit at [Washington] headquarters ... no connection was made
95 See Gertz, supra note 42.
96 Id. See also Neil A. Lewis, F.B.I. Chief Admits 9/11 Might Have Been De-
tectable, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2002, at Al.
97 Lewis, supra note 96.
98 See David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Whistle-Blower Recounts Faults Inside
the F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2002, at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/07/polit-
ics/07INQU.html.
99 Id.
100 Lewis, supra note 96.
101 Johnston & Lewis, supra note 98.
102 See generally Oversight Hearings on Counter-Terrorism: Hearing Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (June 6, 2002) (statement of Col-
leen M. Rowley, F.B.I. Special Agent and Minneapolis Chief Division Counsel).
103 Lewis, supra note 96.
104 Id.
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[between the two,]' 10 5 and he also confessed that "Sept. 11
might have been preventable if officials in his agency had re-
sponded differently to all the pieces of information that were
available."106
The third warning flag was raised on August 23, 2001,
when the Intelligence Community requested that two Al Qaeda
suspects (wanted in connection with the August 2000 attack on
the U.S.S. Cole, and later determined to be participants in the
September 11th attacks) "be added to the U.S. Department of
State's 'watch list' for denying visas" for entry into the United
States. 10 7 While the F.B.I.'s New York field office searched un-
successfully for the two Al Qaeda suspects, the Los Angeles field
office did not even receive the search request until the day of
the attacks. 08 Prior to September 11, 2001, however, both sus-
pects were living openly in San Diego, California, and were ac-
tive members of the San Diego Islamic Center. 0 9 One of the
suspects was actually listed in the public telephone directory, 110
and the other had frequently used his credit card in his own
name."'
A major part of the problem, said Mueller, was the fact that
the F.B.I.'s computer technology did not permit agents to search
existing sources using multiple word phrases, and that "only
single word searches like 'flight' or 'school' could be entered at a
time."" 2 New York Senator Charles E. Schumer called "the
[F.B.I.'s] antiquated system 'almost laughable,' and that "it
[made his] jaw drop to think that on 9/11 or on 9/10 the kind of
technology that is available to most school kids, and certainly
every small business in this country, wasn't available to the
F.B.I."" 13 Mr. Mueller admitted that the F.B.I. was "way be-
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See Hill Statement, supra note 24, at 21.
108 See id.
109 See Patrick E. Tyler, Feeling Secure, U.S. Failed to Grasp bin Laden
Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/interna-
tional/asia/08ATTA.html?tntemailO (last visited Sept. 8, 2002).
110 See id.
111 See id.
112 Johnston & Lewis, supra note 98.
113 Id.
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hind the curve" and predicted that an upgrade to the system
would take at least two to three years to complete. 114
The U.S. Intelligence Community spends billions each year
"on new collection hardware, [and] spy satellites with real-time
imagery of the globe. From space, ground, and sea-based anten-
nae, the [N.S.A.] sucks voice and data streams like a fire hose
and pumps them to computer buffers for analysis. Most of the
data gathers electronic dust there."115 In the war against inter-
national terrorism, the Achilles' heel of the N.S.A. is not its lack
of technology, but rather its lack of expert linguists capable of
translating the sensitive bits of intelligence that are being in-
tercepted around the world.11 6
III. THE ECHELON INTERCEPTION SYSTEM
A. The Menwith Hill and Bad Aibling Interception Stations
With the support of the UKUSA signatories,11 7 the N.S.A.
implements a globally automated intercept and relay system
known as Echelon."" Tantamount to a global eavesdropping
system, Echelon is used by the N.S.A. to intercept ordinary e-
mail, fax, telex, and telephone communications from around the
world.' 19 Although the U.S. has gone to great lengths trying to
keep Echelon top-secret, 20 in July 2001, the European Parlia-
ment released an Official Report, confirming its existence as a
114 See id. See also James Risen & David Johnston, F.B.I. Was Warned It
Could Not Meet Terrorism Threat, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2002, at Al.
115 Tyler, supra note 109.
116 See id.
117 In addition to the five original "first parties" to the Agreement (The U.S.,
U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), it has been reported that Norway,
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Austria, Japan, South Korea, and
Thailand have made "third party" agreements with the United States. See Camp-
bell, supra note 55, at 12 (citing JEFFREY RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE Es-
TABLISHMENT (4th ed. 1999).
11 See HAGER, supra note 53. See also Duncan Campbell, Inside ECHELON.
The History, Structure and Function of the Global Surveillance System Known as
ECHELON, TELEPOLIS, July 25, 2000, at http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/
6929/1.html; Parliament Report on ECHELON supra note 57; Martin Asser, Eche-
lon: Big Brother Without a Cause?, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/
820758.stm (last visited Aug. 9, 2002).
119 See HAGER, supra note 53, at ch. 2.
120 See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ECHELONWATCH: ANSWERS TO FRE.
QUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ) ABOUT ECHELON, at http://www.aclu.org/
echelonwatch/faq.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
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global system for the interception of private and commercial
communications. 121
The Echelon interception system links supercomputers
throughout the world to "automatically search through the mil-
lions of intercepted messages for ones containing pre-program-
med keywords or fax, telex and e-mail addresses." 122 Echelon is
comprised of approximately twenty interception stations
throughout the world, 123 each "linked directly to the headquar-
ters of the secretive [N.S.A.] headquarters at Fort Mead, Mary-
land,"1 24 where intercepted data can be analyzed, retained and
disseminated. The largest of the N.S.A.'s Echelon interception
stations is located in Menwith Hill, England,125 and in 1992, it
is rumored that as many as 1,500 U.S. employees were sta-
tioned there. 126
At the Menwith Hill interception station, the N.S.A. oper-
ates what have been described as "'giant golf balls,' called ra-
domes,"127 which communicate with satellites in geostationary
orbit, to intercept e-mail, fax, and telephone communications
from around the world. 128 British Telecom recently "revealed
that at least three major domestic fiber-optic telephone trunk
lines - each capable of carrying 100,000 calls simultaneously
- were [also] wired through Menwith Hill . . . allow[ing] the
N.S.A. to tap into the very heart of the British Telecomm net-
work."' 29 Clearly, "[it is a [processing] station which affects
people throughout the world."130
The N.S.A. operates its third largest Echelon interception
station in Bad Aibling, Germany, on "land that has been de-
clared U.S. territory for the sole purpose of housing a satellite
121 See Paul Meller, European Parliament Adopts 'Echelon' Report, at http:/!
www.cnn.com/2001/tech/internet/09/07/echelon.report.idg/index.html (last visited
Feb. 9, 2002). See also Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57.
122 HAGER, supra note 53, at 29.
123 See US to Close Echelon Spy Station, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/word/eu-
rope/1365156.stm (last visited Aug. 9, 2002).
124 Asser, supra note 118.
125 See HAGER, supra note 53, at ch. 2.
126 See id.
127 Asser, supra note 118.
128 See id.
129 Poole, supra note 53, at 8 ("Inside Menwith Hill") (relying on Duncan
Campbell, BT Condemned for Eliciting Cables to US Sigint Station (Sept. 4, 1997)
at http://duncan.gn.apc.org/menwith.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002)).
130 HAGER, supra note 53, at 40.
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receiving facility."131 As a result of September 11, 2001, the
U.S. put off its plans to close the Bad Aibling station because of
its importance in fighting the war against international terror-
ism. 132 The decision to keep the Bad Aibling station open was
made by U.S. officials, despite clear warnings that the "tenta-
cles of the Echelon network stretch so far that ... involvement
could constitute a breach of human rights ....
B. Echelon: The Abuse of Power
Not only do former intelligence service officers attest to the
existence of Echelon,134 but also to the abuse of its power.' 35
Evidence received by the Temporary Committee on the Echelon
interception system supported the allegation that the N.S.A.
had engaged in the unfair use of "its intelligence services to
help U.S. firms win contracts."' 36 "The first came from a Balti-
more Sun report which said the European consortium Airbus
lost a $6bn contract with Saudi Arabia after [the] N.S.A. found
[that] Airbus officials were offering kickbacks to a Saudi offi-
cial." 13 7 Evidence received by the Temporary Committee sug-
gested "intervention by the Advocacy Center to the benefit of
U.S. firms ,"138 and that Echelon was being used unfairly to en-
gage in industrial espionage by passing sensitive information
on to U.S. firms via the CIA. 139
The testimony of a former N.S.A. employee confirmed that
"[a]s early as 1978, Echelon was capable of intercepting tele-
communications to and from a particular person via satel-
131 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57.
132 See Bad Aibling Station to Close, U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
COMMAND, May 31, 3001, available at http://www.inscom.army.mil/bas to close.
asp. See also US to Defer Spy Station Closure, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2001, at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20011025/aponlinel3l445_000.htm;
Tony Czuczka, US to Shut Spy Base in Germany, June 5, 2001, at http://www.
cndyorks.gn.apc.orglyspace/articles/badaiblingtoclose2.htm.
133 E-mail Users Warned Over Spy Network, BBC NEWS, May 29, 2001, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1357264.stm.
134 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 67.
135 See Thomas Catan, Secrets and Spies, FIN. TIMES (London), May 31, 2000,
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2000/05/ftO53100.html.
136 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 68.
137 Asser, supra note 118.
138 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 68.
139 See Asser, supra note 118.
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lite,"140 and alleged that conversations of U.S. Senator Strom
Thurmond had been intercepted. 141 Another ex-N.S.A. em-
ployee testified that industrial espionage had become Echelon's
top priority, and that it was routinely being used to benefit U.S.
companies. 142 Troubled about the use of Echelon to intercept
private civilian communications, this employee contended that
it was even being utilized to spy on non-governmental organiza-
tions like Amnesty International and Greenpeace. 143
The testimony of a former Canadian Secret Service ("CSE")
employee affirmed that Echelon monitored civilian communica-
tions. 44 Alarmingly, he recalled "that the CSE actually had en-
tered the name and telephone number of a woman in a database
of possible terrorists because she had used an ambiguous
phrase in a harmless telephone conversation with a friend."145
Another ex-CSE employee, who believed he was expelled from
CSE because he criticized their new emphasis on civilian
targets, testified to intercepting "information on trade with
other countries, including negotiations on NAFTA, Chinese
purchases of cereals and French arms sales,"1 46 and to routinely
targeting Greenpeace.
Even the ex-Director of the CIA, James Woolsey, has ad-
mitted that the U.S. conducts industrial espionage in Europe. 147
Woolsey, however, maintained that 95% of the 'economic intelli-
gence' collected by the U.S. is obtained by evaluating publicly
accessible information, and only 5% comes from stolen
secrets. 48 Furthermore, Woolsey insisted that the economic in-
telligence obtained illegally is not passed on to U.S. companies,
and is collected only "in order to combat bribery in connection
with the award of [international] contracts." 149 "If the current
allegations are true, [however,] all abiding European citizens
140 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 71.
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 72.
145 Id. at 71.
146 Id. at 72.
147 See James Woolsey, former CIA Director, Briefing at the Foreign Press
Center (Mar. 7, 2000), available at http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia.htm. (last vis-
ited Oct. 12, 2002).
148 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 72.
149 Id.
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and companies are at risk of being monitored every day without
any legal basis."150
IV. ANTI-TERROR MEASURES IN THE WAKE OF
SEPTEMBER 11TH
In the year following September 11, 2001, nations through-
out the world have adopted comprehensive measures designed
to prevent future terrorist attacks. 151 One such national mea-
sure, the USA Patriot Act ("USAPA"), 152 now provides the
United States with the additional tools required for enhanced
surveillance operations, government coordination, and informa-
150 Yaman Akdeniz, Statement for the European Parliament, Temporary Com-
mittee on the Echelon Interception System, CYBER RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES, Mar.
22, 2001, at http://www.cyber-rights.org/reports/echelonya.pdf.
151 See generally Press Release SC/7518, United Nations Security Council, Se-
curity Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution;
Calls For Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation; Resolu-
tion 1373 also Creates Committee to Monitor Implementation (Sept. 28, 2001),
http://www.un.org(News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm; Press Release Press 327
Nr: 12019/01, Brussels, Extraordinary Council Meeting - Justice, Home Affairs
and Civil Protection (Sept. 20, 2001), http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?
MAX= 1&BID=86&DID=68116&LANG= 1; EU Unites Region Against Terror, CNN.
COM, Oct. 21, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/10/20/gen.sum-
mit.eu/index.html; UK Passes Anti-terror Law, CNN.coM, Dec. 14, 2001, at http:l/
www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/12/14/gen.britain.law/index.html; UK MP's
Vote For Anti-Terror Bill, CNN.coM, Nov. 20, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
WORLD/europe/11/20/gen.britain.bill/index.html; The Regulation of Investigatory
Powers (Interception of Communications: Code of Practice) (2002) SI 2002/1693
[hereinafter SI 2002/1693]; The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Covert Sur-
veillance: Code of Practice) (2002) SI 2002/1933 [hereinafter SI 2002/1933]; The
Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Maintenance of Interception Capability: Code
of Practice) (2002) SI 2002/1931 [hereinafter SI 2002/1931]; Uniting and Strength-
ening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
[hereinafter USAPA]. See also Bush Signs Antiterrorism Bill Into Law, CNN.coM,
Oct. 26, 2001, at http: / /www.cnn.com /2001 /US/ 10 /26/rec. bush.antiterror. bill/
index. html; President Bush, Remarks by the President at the Signing of the Patriot
Act, ONLINE NEWS HOUR, Oct. 26, 2001, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terror-
ism/bushterrorismbill.html [hereinafter Bush Remarks]; France Toughens An-
titerror Laws, CNN.coM, Nov. 1, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001IWORLD/
europe/11/01/inv.france.measures/index.html; Anthony DePalma, A Nation Chal-
lenged: Security Concerns, Canada Altering Its System of Vigilance Against Terror,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at B4; Passwords Access for Police, THE NEW ZEALAND
HERALD, Mar. 19, 2002, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?storyID=
1240906; Colombia Authorizes Warrantless Arrests, Citing Terror Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2002, at A7.
152 See USAPA, supra note 151.
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tion-sharing.153 Unquestionably, the new investigative tools
made available to intelligence gathering agencies throughout
the world will play an integral role in fighting the war against
international terrorism.1 5 4
In the wake of September 11, 2001, the European Union
("EU") has also approved tough new measures to prevent future
terrorist attacks.1 55 Just nine days after the attacks, "EU jus-
tice and home affairs ministers approved a total of thirty-seven
proposals intended to stop terrorist groups from operating in
the EU and to strengthen police and justice cooperation with
the U.S."156 The newest EU anti-terror measures include a Eu-
ropean search and arrest warrant, an agreement to strengthen
information sharing among EU law enforcement authorities,
and the establishment of an anti-terror unit within Europol. 57
Since September 11, 2001, at least forty countries have
adopted a declaration expressing their "wholehearted support"
for sharing intelligence on terrorist activity,158 and today, EU
leaders continue to meet with U.S. officials regarding their sup-
porting role in the war against terrorism. The Director of Euro-
pol, however, has recently warned that not all Member States
153 See OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 22, at 47; Frank Thorsberg
PC World Poll Highlights Privacy Concerns, CNN.coM, Oct. 8, 2001, at http://
www.cnn.com/2001/TECH/industry/10/08/privacy.poll.idg/index.html; Bush Signs
Antiterrorism Bill into Law, supra note 151; Bush Remarks, supra note 151.
154 See Bush Remarks, supra note 151.
155 See Commission Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating
Terrorism, 2001 O.J. (C 364); Europe Agrees Anti-Terror Laws, CNN.coM, Sept. 20,
2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/09/20/gen.eu.ministers/index.
html.
156 Europe Agrees Anti-Terror Laws, supra note 155. See also EU Governments
Want the Retention of All Telecommunications Data for General Use by Law En-
forcement Agencies Under Terrorism Plan, STATEWATCH NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 2001,
at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/sep/20authoritarian.htm; Interception of
Telecommunications in the EU, STATEWATCH NEWS ONLINE, Nov. 2001, at http://
www.statewatch.orglnews/2001/oct/15intercept.htm.
157 See Interception of Telecommunications in the EU, supra note 156; Press
Release: 175 Nr: 9620/02, Luxembourg, 2436th Council Meeting Justice, Internal
Affairs, and Civil Protection (June 13, 2002), http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/make
Frame.asp?MAX=1&BID=86&DID=71236&LANG=1&File=/pressDatalenijha/712
36.pdf&Picture=0 [hereinafter Press Release: 175 Nr: 9620/02]. Established in
1992 and beginning operations in 1994, Europol is the European Union law en-
forcement organization that handles criminal intelligence between Member States.
See The European Police Office - Fact Sheet, at http://www.europol.eu.int/con-
tent.htm?facts/en.htm.
158 See Press Release: 175 Nr: 9620/02, supra note 157.
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are prepared to exchange intelligence data with other coun-
tries1 59 and that the central problem involved balancing funda-
mental civil rights and freedoms with the increased need for
international security measures. 160
Prime Minster Blair declared that the U.K. stood "side by
side with ... [the U.S.] now, without hesitation,"161 and vowed
to take action at every single level to eradicate the threat posed
by international terrorism. 62 Subsequently, the U.K. re-
quested that communications service providers retain all logs of
e-mails sent and received, all logs showing internet usage, and
all logs of sources, destinations and times of all calls made on
telephone networks. 63 Not surprisingly, there has been wide
criticism of the U.K. plan that would give law enforcement offi-
cials sweeping access to personal data.16 4 Even the U.K. Infor-
mation Commissioner wrote: "The scope of the powers proposed
to be given to the secretary of state is immensely broad. The
lack of any overt safeguards against abuse indicates a lack of
proportionality such as to render the prospective legislation in-
compatible with European [C]onvention rights. "165
Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder also made assur-
ances that Germany was prepared to "give its unreserved sup-
port to the United States of America"166 in the war against
international terrorism. Toward that end, a number of "changes
to German law [have been] rushed through both chambers of
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair, Remarks by the Presi-
dent and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair (Sept. 20, 2001), http:fl
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-7.html.
162 See id.
163 See Data Surveillance Introduced in UK and USA, STATEWATCH NEWS ON-
LINE, Sept. 2001, at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/sep/llretorder.htm; UK
Plans for the Retention of Data for 12 Months, STATEWATCH NEWS ONLINE, Nov.
2001, at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/nov/17ukdata.htm; SI 2002/1693,
supra note 151; SI 2002/1933 supra note 151; SI 2002/1931, supra note 151.
164 See Patrick Wintour, Lords 'Sabotage' Forces Concessions on Terror Bill,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Dec. 8, 2001, at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/attacks/story/
0,1320,615398,00.html.
165 Id.
166 Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany, Policy Statement Made
to the German Bundestag (Sept. 19, 2001), http://eng.bundesregierung.de/doku-
mente/Rede/ix_56718.htm.
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the German parliament . . . "167 despite warnings about the
"dangers for personal privacy ... arising from new supervisory
powers and the virtually unlimited access.., by the intelligence
services and national law enforcement agencies to [personal]
data."168 In particular, experts in Germany "criticized the ex-
tension of powers made to the intelligence services, as well as
the inter-linking of data between various secret services." 69
"U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, [however,] praised Ger-
many's newly enacted law ... [as] a necessary measure in the
war against terrorism." 7 °
On October 26, 2001, President George W. Bush signed the
USA Patriot Act into law.' 71 The USAPA not only grants U.S.
authorities wide-ranging surveillance powers, 72 but removes
several of the checks and balances that were in place prior to
September 11, 2001, that prevented U.S. authorities from im-
properly conducting surveillance activities. 173 For computer
users especially, the USAPA opens the door for widespread sur-
veillance activity of the internet and e-mail systems.' 74 Fur-
thermore, "the protections against the misuse of these
authorities - by the foreign intelligence agencies to spy on U.S.
citizens and by law enforcement to use foreign intelligence au-
thority to exceed their domestic surveillance authority - have
167 Elisabeth Zimmerman, Second Package of Anti-terror Laws Rushed
Through German Parliament, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE, Jan. 15, 2002, at http:/!
www.wsws.org/articles/2002/jan2002/anti-jl5.shtml. See Cabinet Approves Draft
Legislation Against Terrorism, DIE BUNDESREGIERUNG, http://eng.bundesregie
rung.de/top/dokumente/Redeix_56718.htm?template=single&id=56718&script=
1&ixepf=56718 (last updated Aug. 11, 2001); Second Anti-Terrorism Package Ap-
proved, DIE BUNDESREGIERUNG, http://eng.bundesregierung.de/top/dokumente/
Rede/ix_56718.htm?template=single&id=56718&script=l&ixepf=56718 (last up-
dated July 1, 2002).
168 See Second Anti-terrorism Package, DIE BUNDESREGIERUNG, supra note 167.
169 Id.
170 Associated Press, Ashcroft Praises German Anti-Terror Law, CB-
SNEWS.coM, Dec. 14, 2001, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/12/14/attack/
main321361.shtml.
171 See USAPA, supra note 151.
172 See Bush Signs Antiterrorism Bill into Law, supra note 151.
173 See EEF Analysis of the Provisions of the USA Patriot Act that Relate to
Online Activities, ELECTRIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Oct. 31, 2001, at http://www.
eff.orgfPrivacy/Surveillance/Terrorism-militias/20011031eff usa-patriot-analy-
sis.html.
174 See id.
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been greatly reduced."1 7 5 President Bush, however, maintains
that the USAPA "protects, rather than erodes, civil liberties by
increasing federal authorities' ability to prevent, rather than
just respond to terrorist attacks."1 7 6
Since September 11, 2001, the N.S.A. has undoubtedly
stepped up its use of the Echelon interception system "to moni-
tor domestic and international e-mail traffic."177 In response,
civil libertarians have expressed concern that the increased sur-
veillance power provided by the USAPA will have an adverse
impact on personal privacy because "in the government's fast-
moving and expansive search for terrorists,"1 7 8 an enormous
amount of personal data will be intercepted, analyzed, and
archived.1 79 If the proper safeguards are not put into place, the
fundamental right to privacy in Europe may become the next
casualty in the U.S. led war against international terrorism.
V. SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
PRIVACY IN EUROPE
Any activity "involving the interception of communications
and even the recording of data by intelligence services... repre-
sents a serious violation of an individual's privacy."180 The
unrestricted interception of private communications by govern-
ment authorities is only permitted in a 'police state.'1 s "In con-
trast, in the EU Member States, which are mature democra-
cies," 18 2 the necessity for government intelligence services to re-
spect an individual's privacy is "unchallenged and is generally
enshrined in national constitutions."1 3 "Privacy thus enjoys
special protection: potential violations are authorized only fol-
lowing analysis of the legal considerations and in accordance
with the principle of proportionality."18 4
175 Id.
176 Bush Signs Antiterrorism Bill into Law, supra note 151.
177 Thorsberg, supra note 153.
178 Id.
179 See id.
180 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 83.
181 See id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
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The European Union has always affirmed its commitment
to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.18 5
The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") (as amended by the
Amsterdam Treaty)186 ensures citizens of EU Member States
the protection of those fundamental rights and freedoms guar-
anteed by the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR").'8 7
These rights and freedoms are not only binding on Member
States, but the "Union is also required to comply.., in its legis-
lation and administration."188 "This includes respect for pri-
vacy of communications and personal data."18 9
"In principle, activities and measures undertaken for the
purposes of state security or law enforcement do not fall within
the scope of the EC Treaty [Establishing the European Commu-
nity ("EC Treaty")] .... "190 As a result, when a Member State
utilizes the Echelon interception system for national security
purposes, e.g., combating international terrorism, the State in-
terference is entirely beyond the scope of the EC Treaty. 191
Since Article X of the EC Treaty commits Member States to act
185 Citizens' Rights, Fundamental Rights, EUROPA, at http://www.europa.eu.
int/abc/citlen.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2002).
186 See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 10, 1997, O.J. C 340/145 [hereinafter
TEU].
187 See The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, as Amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. See also TEU arts. 6, 7. Article 6 of the Treaty
states:
(1) The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect
for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, princi-
ples which are common to the Member States.
(2) The Union shall respect all fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1959 and as they result from
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general
principles of Community law.
188 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 81.
189 Akdeniz, supra note 150. See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note
57, at 81.
190 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 80. See TREATY ESTAB-
LISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, O.J. C 340/173 [hereinafter EC TREATY], in-
corporating changes made by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/
1.
191 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 80-81.
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in good faith, 192 the use of Echelon to intercept private commu-
nications for industrial espionage purposes would be "funda-
mentally at odds with the concept of common-market
underpinning the EC Treaty, as it would amount to a distortion
of competition." 193 When a Member State utilizes the Echelon
interception system to gain intelligence for industrial espionage
purposes, either by "allowing its own intelligence service to op-
erate such a system, or by giving foreign intelligence services
access to its territory for this purpose, it would undoubtedly
constitute a breach of EC law."1 94
When a EU Member State utilizes the Echelon interception
system for national security purposes, 195 e.g., combating inter-
national terrorism, they "cannot therefore be in breach of the
EC's data protection directives" 196 because Directives 95/46/
EC 197 and 97/66/EC' 98 do not apply "to the processing of data
192 See EC TREATY art. 10. "Member States shall take appropriate measures,
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of
this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community.
They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall ab-
stain from any measures which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of
this Treaty." Id.
193 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 82.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 80-81.
196 Id. at 81.
197 See id. at 80. Article 1 of the Directive states: "In accordance with this Di-
rective, Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natu-
ral persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing
of personal data." Council Directive 95/46 of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Move-
ment of Such Data, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L281)1 [hereinafter Data Directive]. Article
3(2) of the Directive states: "This Directive shall not apply to the processing of
personal data: in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Commu-
nity law, such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the European Union, and
in any case to processing operations concerning public security, defense, State se-
curity (including the economic well-being of the State when the activities relate to
State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law." Id.
art. 3(2), 1995, O.J. (L281) 2.
198 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 80. Article 1 of the
Directive states: "This directive provides for the harmonization of the provisions of
the Member States required to ensure an equivalent level of protection of funda-
mental rights and freedoms, and in particular the right to privacy, with respect to
the processing of personal data in the telecommunications sector and to ensure the
free movement of such data and of telecommunications equipment and services in
the Community." Council Directive 97/66 of 15 December 1977 Concerning the
Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunica-
tions Sector, art. 1, 1998 O.J. (L024) 1. Article 3 of the Directive states: "This
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*.. concerning public security, defense, [and] State security
.... 199 Similarly, the use of Echelon to process data inter-
cepted from private communications cannot be in breach of Ar-
ticle 286 of the EC Treaty200 or Regulation 45/200 1201 because
neither is applicable to the processing of data concerning State
security, defense, or public security. 20 2 The use of Echelon by a
Member State to intercept competitive intelligence for indus-
trial espionage purposes, however, would "be an infringement of
the data protection directives for the telecommunications
sphere,"20 3 as the interception is "not being carried out for the
purposes of security or law enforcement .. . and would conse-
quently fall fully within the scope of the directive." 20 4
European law enforcement agencies have recommended
"the adoption of 'data retention' requirements"205 that would re-
quire communications service providers to "archive information
detailing the telephone calls, e-mail messages and other com-
munications of their users."20 6 In the aftermath of September
11, 2001, Member States were finally able to reach political
agreement on a Directive to update the existing Directive 97/66/
Directive shall not apply to the activities which fall outside the scope of Commu-
nity law, such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European
Union, and in any access to activities concerning public security, defense, State
security (including the economic well-being of the State when the activities relate
to State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law."
Id. art. 1, 1998 O.J. (L024) 3.
199 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 80-81.
200 See EC TREATY art. 286. Article 286 (1) of the Treaty states: "Community
acts on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and the free movement of such data shall apply to the institutions and bodies set
up by, or on the basis of, this Treaty." Article 286 (2) of the Treaty states: "The
Council shall establish an independent supervisory body responsible for monitor-
ing the application of such Community acts to Community institutions and bodies
and shall adopt any other relevant provisions appropriate."
201 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 81. See also Coun-
cil Regulation 45/2001 of 18 December 2000 on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by the Community Institutions and
Bodies and on Free Movement of Such Data, art. 20(1)(d), 2001 O.J. (L008) Id.
202 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 81.
203 Id. at 82.
204 Id.
205 ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER (EPIC), DATA RETENTION (Aug.
2002), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/intl/dataretention.html [hereinafter EPIC].
206 Id.
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EC.20 7 In July 2002, the European Parliament formally
adopted Directive 2002/58/EC, 20 which permits Member States
to implement national measures that authorize the retention of
personal data.20 9 While Member States have until October 31,
2003 to implement the Directive, some States (e.g., Belgium,
France, Great Britain, and Spain) have already provided na-
tional regulations for the retention of electronic data.210 In the
interim, however, Directive 2002/58/EC neither "alters the ex-
isting balance between the individual's right to privacy and the
possibility for Member States to take measures . . .necessary
for the protection of public security, defense, [and] State secur-
ity,"211 nor precludes States from carrying out "the lawful inter-
ception of electronic communications." 2
As a general proposition, the Echelon interception system
"is not in breach of Union law because it does not concern the
aspects of Union law that would be required for there to be in-
compatibility."21 3 This applies, however, only where Echelon is
utilized exclusively for national security purposes. 214 If, on the
other hand, Echelon is utilized to collect competitive intelli-
gence for "industrial espionage directed against foreign firms,
this would constitute an infringement of EC law."215
A. The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and The Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union
"Privacy and freedom of expression are fundamental
human rights recognised in all major international and regional
agreements and treaties."216 At the United Nations level, Arti-
207 See Council Directive 2002/58 of 31 July 2002 The Directive on Privacy and
Electronic Communications 2002 O.J. (L 201) 4 [hereinafter Council Directive
2002/58/EC], available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cii/regulatory/telecomms/telecom
msregulations/comms-dpd.shtml#ov.
208 See id.
209 See id.
210 See EPIC, supra note 205.
211 Council Directive 2002/58, supra note 207, para. 11.
212 Id.
213 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 82.
214 See id.
215 Id.
216 Akdeniz, supra note 150. See also Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra
note 57, at 83.
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cle 17 of the U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights of December 16, 1966 (ratified by EU Member States), 217
guarantees the fundamental right to privacy.218 The Cove-
nant's Optional Protocol authorizes a "[Human Rights] Commit-
tee to receive and examine communications from individuals
who claim to have been the victim of a breach of one of the
rights established by the ICCPR."219 Since the Covenant's Op-
tional Protocol has not been signed by the U.S., "individuals
cannot appeal to the Human Rights Committee in the event of
the violation of the Covenant by the U.S.A."22o
At the European level, the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union 221 was drafted with the objective of in-
stituting measures in Europe for the protection of fundamental
rights. 222 In particular, Article 7 of the Charter expressly
states that individuals have a fundamental right to respect for
his or her private communications, 223 and Article 8 affirms that
individuals have a fundamental right to the protection of their
personal data.224 Since the Charter has not yet been incorpo-
217 See Committee Report on the Situation as Regards Fundamental Rights in
the European Union, EuR. PARL. Doc. (A5-0223/2001) 45 (2001) [hereinafter Par-
liament Report on Fundamental Rights]. See also International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights Dec. 19, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
218 See ICCPR, supra note 217, art. 17. Article 17(1) of the Covenant states:
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputa-
tion." Id. Article 17(2) of the Covenant states: "Everyone has the right to the pro-
tection of the law against such interference or attacks." Id.
219 Conventions of the United Nations and of the Council of Europe on Human
Rights, Status of Ratification of the Main International Texts on the Protection of
Human Rights Adopted Under the Auspices of the United Nations, EUROPEAN PAR-
LIAMENT, at http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/libe/elsj/charter/un legislationen.
htm; Article 41(1) of the Covenant reads: "A State Party to the present Covenant
may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the
Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party
claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the present
Covenant." Id.
220 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 84.
221 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000,
O.J. C 364/1 (2000).
222 See id. at pmbl.
223 See id. art. 7. "Respect for private and family life: Everyone has the right to
respect for his or her private and family life, home, and communications." Id.
224 See id. art. 8. Article 8 of the Charter states:
(1) Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning
him or her.
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rated into the EU Treaty, it is only binding "on the three insti-
tutions which pledged to comply with it in the Formal
Declaration adopted during the Nice European Council: the
Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament."22
5
Even when the Charter acquires full legal force through its incor-
poration into the Treaty, due account will have to be taken of its
limited scope. Pursuant to Article 51, the Charter applies to 'the
institutions and bodies of the Union .. .only when they are im-
plementing Union law.'226
B. The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights & Fundamental Freedoms
The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR" or the "Conven-
tion") of November 4, 1950 (ratified by all Member States),227 is
one of the greatest achievements of modern Europe. 228 Gov-
erned by the rules of international law,229 the ECHR creates a
uniform level of protection for the fundamental rights and free-
doms guaranteed to all EU citizens. 230 The ECHR not only
"guarantees respect for private and family life, home and corre-
spondence "but also establishes the right to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority
.... "231 Today, the ECHR is the only effective European instru-
ment that comprehensively protects individual privacy
rights,232 and it now provides more than 450 million citizens of
EU Member States the right to bring allegations claiming a vio-
(2) Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis
laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been
collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
(3) Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an indepen-
dent authority. Id.
225 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 84.
226 Id.
227 See generally ECHR, supra note 187.
228 See R. BEDDARD, HuMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE 1 (1993).
229 See id.
230 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 84.
231 Parliament Report on Fundamental Rights, supra note 217, at 45.
232 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 84.
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lation of their rights under the Convention before the European
Court of Human Rights ("the Court"). 233
Section II of the Convention establishes the Court, a legal
forum for "applications from any person, non-governmental or-
ganization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a
violation ... of the rights set forth in the Convention .... *"234
The Court's jurisdiction extends "to all matters concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention,"235 and par-
ties contract "under international law to guarantee the rights
enshrined in the ECHR and... [declare] that they will comply
with the judgments of the European Court .. ."236 Upon re-
ceiving an application alleging a breach of a protected right, the
Court reviews the relevant national legal provisions and hands
down judgment that "shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party."237
The fundamental rights enshrined in the ECHR are not
linked to nationality, 238 but represent generally accepted rights
guaranteed to all persons within the jurisdiction of the con-
tracting parties. 239 "The rights guaranteed by the ECHR vis-h-
vis a contracting state are thus also enjoyed by persons outside
the territory of that state if those persons suffer interference in
the exercise of their right to privacy."240 This is
particularly important here, since a specific characteristic of the
issue of fundamental rights in the area of telecommunications
surveillance is the fact that there may be a substantial geographi-
cal distance between the state responsible for the surveillance,
the person under surveillance, and the location where the inter-
ception is actually carried out. 241
233 See BEDDARD, supra note 228, at 1.
234 ECHR, supra note 187, § 2, art. 34.
235 Id. § 2, art. 32.
236 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 84.
237 ECHR, supra note 187, art. 41.
238 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 85.
239 See id.
240 Id. (citing Loiziduo v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 435, 514
(1993)).
241 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 85.
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1. Article 8 of the ECHR
Article 8 of the ECHR guarantees everyone "the respect for
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence." 2
42
Although the plain language of the Convention contains no ex-
plicit reference to the protection of private telecommunica-
tions, 243 the Court makes clear that the covert interception of
private telecommunications falls within the scope of Article
8.244 Article 8 provides Europeans such broad protection
against government interference with private telecommunica-
tions, that it "covers not only the substance of the communica-
tions, but also the act of recording external data."245 "In other
words, even if an intelligence service merely records data such
as the time and duration of calls and the numbers dialed, this
represents a violation of privacy."246
The essential object of Article 8 is to protect against arbi-
trary State interference with private communications. 247 In or-
der for State interference not to infringe on Article 8 of the
Convention, "it must, according to paragraph 2, first of all have
been 'in accordance with the law."'248
242 ECHR, supra note 187, art. 8. Article 8 of the Convention states:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private life and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the existence
of this right except such as in accord with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. Id.
243 See id.
244 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 85-86. See also
Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 5029/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214
(1978) (Court); Khan v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 35394/97, 31 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 45 (2000).
245 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 85.
246 Id. See Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14
(1984).
247 See Parliament Report on Fundamental Rights, supra note 217, at 47. See
also Camp and Bourimi v. The Netherlands, App. No. 28369/95 (Oct. 2000), http:l/
hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocViewRoot.asp?Item=O&Action=Html&X=1205020948&
Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O.
248 The Court has held that,
[t]he expression 'in accordance with the law' in paragraph 2 of Article 8
requires that interference must have some basis in domestic law. Compli-
ance with domestic law, however, does not suffice: the law in question
must be accessible to the individual concerned and its consequences for
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/7
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[I1n the context of covert surveillance by public authorities domes-
tic law must provide protection against arbitrary interference
with an individual's right under Article 8; [and] the law must be
sufficiently clear in its terms to give individuals an adequate indi-
cation as to the circumstances in which and the conditions under
which authorities are entitled to resort to such covert
measures.
249
Article 8(2) of the Convention provides the legal basis for
State interference with private communications. 250  Con-
tracting Parties, however, are not completely unrestricted in
their authority to interfere with an individual's private life, and
may only do so "for purposes listed in the second paragraph of
Article 8, and in particular, in the interest of national security
.... 251 Since the scope of Article 8(2) "only covers forms of
interference 'necessary in a democratic society,"'252 Contracting
him must also be foreseeable. However, the requirement of foreseeability
in the special context of secret controls of staff in sectors affecting national
security cannot be the same as in many other fields.
Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, 450 (1987). The
phrase 'in accordance with law' also implies
that there must be a measure of legal protection in domestic law against
arbitrary interference by public authorities with the rights safeguarded in
paragraph 1. Especially where a power of the executive is exercised in
secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. Undoubtedly . .. the re-
quirements of the Convention, notably in regard to foreseeability, cannot
be exactly the same as in the special context of interception of communica-
tions for the purposes of police investigations as they are where the object
of the relevant law is to put restrictions on the conduct of individuals. In
particular, the requirement of foreseeability cannot mean that an individ-
ual should be enabled to foresee when the authorities are likely to inter-
cept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct accordingly.
Nevertheless, the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citi-
zens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the con-
ditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to secret and
potentially dangerous interference with the right to respect for private life
and correspondence.
Malone, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep at 40. See lass, 2 Eur. H.R. at 232.
249 Parliament Report on Fundamental Rights, supra note 217, at 47.
250 See ECHR, supra note 187, art. 8(2).
251 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 86.
252 Id. (emphasis added). In determining whether interference with private
life is 'necessary in a democratic society,' the Court has summarized certain
principles:
(a) the adjective 'necessary' is not synonymous with 'indispensable,'
neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as 'admissible,' 'ordinary,'
'useful,' 'reasonable' or 'desirable'; (b) the Contracting States enjoy a cer-
tain but not unlimited margin of appreciation in the matter of the imposi-
20021
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Parties are not justified in utilizing the Echelon interception
system for the gathering of competitive intelligence for indus-
trial espionage purposes.253
While national security, e.g., combating international ter-
rorism, can clearly be invoked by a Contracting State to justify
the interception of private communications, 254 the principle of
proportionality still applies. 255 The Court has held that a
"State may not, in the name of the struggle against ... terror-
ism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate."
256
In that connection, the European Court of Human Rights has
clearly stated that the interest of the State in protecting its na-
tional security must be weighed against the seriousness of the in-
vasion of an individual's privacy. 257
As a result, the "mere usefulness or desirability [of intelligence]
is not sufficient justification"258 for the interference with pri-
vate communications. The belief, therefore, "that the intercep-
tion of all private telecommunications, even if permissible
under national law, represents the best form of protection
[against international terrorism], would amount to a breach of
Article 8."259
2. The Case Law: Article 8 of the ECHR
Given the covert nature of national intelligence services,
the interception of private communications demands a careful
tion of restrictions, but it is for the Court to give the final ruling on
whether they are compatible with the Convention; (c) the phrase 'neces-
sary in a democratic society' means that, to be compatible with the Con-
vention, the interference must, inter alia, correspond to a 'pressing social
need' and be 'proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued'; (d) those
paragraphs of Article of the Convention which provide for an exception to
a right guaranteed are to be narrowly interpreted.
Silver v. United Kingdom, App. No. 38394/97, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 347, 376 (1983).
See also Khan, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 26.
253 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 86.
254 See id. at 86.
255 See id.
256 Klass, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 232.
257 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 86. See Leander, 9
Eur. H.R. Rep. at 452.
258 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 86. See Silver, 5 Eur.
H.R. Rep. at 376.
259 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 86-87 (emphasis
added).
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weighing of competing interests 260 and requires that adequate
provisions be made for the stringent monitoring of covert sur-
veillance activities.261
The European Court of Human Rights has explicitly drawn atten-
tion to the fact that a secret surveillance system operated for the
purpose of protecting national security carries with it the risk
that, under the pretext of defending democracy, it may undermine
or even destroy the democratic system, so that more effective
guarantees are needed to prevent such misuse of powers. 2 62
The use of Echelon for the interception of private "communica-
tions can constitute an interference with the right to respect for
private life and correspondence in breach of Art. 8(2), unless it
is carried out in accordance with a legal provision capable of
protecting against arbitrary interference by the State with the
rights guaranteed."263 Moreover, the Court has held that since
Article 8(2) "provides for an exception to a right guaranteed by
the Convention, [it] is to be narrowly interpreted,"264 and in any
given case, the need for the interference with private communi-
cations must be convincingly established. 265
Furthermore, the relevant provisions of domestic law must be
both accessible and their consequences foreseeable, in that the
conditions and circumstances in which the state is empowered to
take secret measures such as telephone monitoring should be
clearly indicated .... 266
In a case raising the applicability of a Swedish law with
Article 8 of the Convention, 267 the Court held that the law,
which provided a system for maintaining a secret register of pri-
260 See id. See also Leander, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 452.
261 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 87. See also KIass,
2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 232.
262 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 87. See Leander, 9
Eur. H.R. Rep. at 453.
263 Akdeniz, supra note 150, at 3. See Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No.
8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (1985). See also Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, App.
No. 27671195, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep 483 (1999).
264 mlass, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 230.
265 See Akdeniz, supra note 150.
266 Id. See Kruslin v. France, App. No. 11801/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 547 (1990).
See also Huvig v. France, App. No. 11105/84, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528 (1999); Halford
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20605/92, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 523 (1997); Valenzuela
Contreras, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 483.
267 See Leander, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433.
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vate information, was sufficiently clear that the interference
with private life was "in accordance with the law."268 Noting
that in special cases of national security, "the arrangements
governing the foreseeability requirement must differ from those
in other areas,"269 the Court concluded that the national law
incorporated sufficient precautionary measures to meet the re-
quirements of Article 8 of the Convention, and that the interfer-
ence with privacy was lawful.270
In a case raising the applicability of a German law with Ar-
ticle 8 of the Convention,271 complainants argued that their fun-
damental right to privacy had been violated because the law did
not require authorities to notify the individuals subject to sur-
veillance after the surveillance had taken place.2 7 2 After hold-
ing that telephone conversations are "within ambit of 'private
life' and the concept of 'correspondence,'"273 the Court agreed
that the applicants may have been victims of a violation of Arti-
cle 8 of the Convention.274 In order to determine whether the
interference was 'necessary in a democratic society,'275 the Court
developed a test that turned on the existence of adequate safe-
guards against possible abuse. Simply, "[tlhe Court must be
satisfied that, whatever system of surveillance is adopted, there
exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse."276
The Court initially expressed concern about the supervi-
sory controls over the surveillance, 277 but then held that the
German law authorized the surveillance to an "official qualified
for judicial office and by the Parlimentary Board and the G10
268 Id. (emphasis added).
269 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 86.
270 See FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 209 (1996).
271 See Mass, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214.
272 See JACOBS & WHITE supra note 270, at 207.
273 Id.
274 See id.
275 See id. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to
a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. Parliament Report on Fundamental Rights, supra note 217, at 47.
See also Foxley v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 33274/96, para. 43 (June 20,
2000).
276 Id. (quoting Kass, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 232). See JACOBS & WHITE, supra
note 270, at 207
277 See JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 270, at 207.
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Commission."278 Taking judicial notice of technological im-
provements in the means of communications surveillance, and
an increase in terrorist activity in Europe, the Court concluded
that the German legislative scheme for regulating surveillance
activities satisfied the requirements of Article 8 of the Conven-
tion, and that the Applicant's fundamental right had not been
violated. 279
In a subsequent English case,28 0 law enforcement authori-
ties were engaged in surveillance activity that involved the cov-
ert interception of telecommunications. 28 1 The deficiency of an
appropriate statutory framework governing the U.K.'s surveil-
lance activity, however, proved fatal to the government's case.
The Court stated:
[Tihe law of England and Wales does not indicate with reasonable
clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the relevant discretion
conferred on the public authorities. To that extent, the minimum
degree of legal protection to which citizens are entitled under the
rule of law in a democratic society is lacking.28 2
The Court concluded that the governmental interference with
the Applicant's private telecommunications was not "in accor-
dance with the law," and therefore a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention.28 3
Two subsequent French cases revealed the Court had found
some middle ground. 28 4 French courts have repeatedly inter-
preted their legislative framework as permitting the intercep-
tion of private communications by senior law enforcement
officials with the proper judicially issued warrants. 28 5 To be 'in
accordance with the law,' however, "the quality of the law must
be such as to provide safeguards against what is a serious inter-
ference with private life."28 6 Since the French statutory frame-
278 Id. (quoting Klass, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 255).
279 See JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 270, at 207-08.
280 See Malone, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (1984).
281 See JACOBS & WHITE supra note 270, at 208.
282 Id. (quoting Malone, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 45).
283 See JACOBS & WHITE supra note 270, at 208.
284 See id. See also Hurig v. France, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 164, 220 (1990); Kruslin v.
France, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 167, 223 (1990).
285 See JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 270, at 208-09.
286 Id.
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work was seriously lacking in measures to prevent abuse,287 the
Court found violations of Article 8.288 The interception of pri-
vate communications by the intelligence services of Contracting
Parties, therefore, can only be consistent with the fundamental
right to privacy guaranteed by the Convention if they are ac-
companied by an adequate system of checks and other measures
to protect against the misuse of power.28 9
3. The Requirements Imposed by Article 8 of the ECHR
The activities of an ECHR Contracting Party's intelligence
service must be compatible with the requirements of law, 290 and
services must not move to circumvent Article 8 of the Conven-
tion.291 In particular, a Contracting Party must not be allowed
to evade the requirements of law "by employing assistance from
other intelligence services ... 292 whose "activities are subject
to less stringent rules."293 "Otherwise, the principle of legality,
with its twin components of accessibility and foreseeability,
would become a dead letter and the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights would be deprived of its substance."294
One implication of this is that data exchanges "between in-
telligence services are permissible only on a restricted basis."295
Intelligence services "may seek from one of its counterparts only
data obtained in a manner consistent with the conditions laid
down in its own national law."296 Moreover, "[t]he geographical
scope for action laid down by [national] law ... may not be ex-
tended by means of agreements with other [intelligence] ser-
vices,"297 and a service "may carry out operations on behalf of
another country's intelligence service . . . only if it is satisfied
287 See JACOBS &WHITE, supra note 270, at 209. "The French system was very
short on processes to prevent abuse, with key aspects of the process not adequately
defined, such as the categories of person liable to have their telephone tapped or
the nature of the offenses which warranted such measures." Id.
288 See id.
289 See Parliament Report on Fundamental Rights, supra note 222, at 47. See
also Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 87.
290 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 87.
291 See id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Id. at 88.
296 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 88.
297 Id.
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that the operations are consistent with the national law of its
own country."298 Even though intercepted data may be "in-
tended for another country, this in no way alters the fact that
an invasion of privacy which could not be foreseen by the legal
subject concerned constitutes a violation of fundamental
rights."299 Another implication is that Contracting Parties
"may not allow other countries' intelligence services to carry out
operations on their territory if they have reason to believe that
those operations are not consistent with the conditions laid
down by the ECHR."300
"By ratifying the ECHR, the Contracting Parties undertook
to subject the exercise of their sovereignty to a review of its con-
sistency with fundamental rights."301 The Contracting Parties
"cannot seek to circumvent this requirement by foregoing the
exercise of that sovereignty,"30 2 and they remain responsible for
surveillance operations taking place within their own territory,
even "if the sovereignty is usurped by the intelligence activities
of another State."30 3 Thus, when a Contracting Party allows a
non-Contracting Party to operate intelligence services from
within its territory, "the protection requirement is much
greater, because .. .another authority is exercising its sover-
eignty. The only logical conclusion is that States must carry out
checks to ensure that the activities of intelligence services on
their territory do not represent a violation of human rights."30 4
If, for example, the U.S. were utilizing their Echelon satel-
lite receiving stations at Menwith Hill, U.K., and Bad Aibling,
Germany "to engage in the interception of non-military commu-
nications . . . [by] private individuals or firms from an ECHR
[C]ontracting [P3arty, supervisory requirements would come
into play under the ECHR. In practical terms, ECHR
[Clontracting [Plarties, Germany and the United Kingdom, are
required to establish that the activities of the American intelli-
gence services do not represent a violation of fundamental
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Id. (citing Dimitri Yernault, ECHELON and Europe, The Protection of Pri-
vacy Against Communications Espionage, J. OF THE CTS., EUR. L., at 187 (2000)).
301 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 88.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
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rights."305 This is even more crucial now, in the wake of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, in light of the concern in Europe over the
N.S.A.'s covert intelligence activities, and considering the en-
hanced U.S. surveillance powers, and strengthened cooperation
and information sharing in the war against international
terrorism.
When surveillance activities involve cooperation between
two Contracting Parties, "both can assume, up to a certain
point, that the other is complying"30 6 with the Convention. This
assumption usually "applies until evidence emerges that an
ECHR [Clontracting [Plarty is violating the Convention on a
systematic, long-term basis."307 Since the U.S. is not "an ECHR
[C]ontracting [P]arty and it has not made its intelligence opera-
tions subject to a similar supervisory system,"308 no such as-
sumption applies.30 9
Europeans have good reason to be concerned about U.S.
surveillance activities in Europe, particularly in light of the fact
that many of the relevant rules that "apply to the activities of
the N.S.A. abroad ... are classified" 310 and not made available
to the public. 311 Disquietingly, the U.S. House of Representa-
tives and Senate committees, which subject the N.S.A. to over-
sight, "show little interest in the activities of N.S.A. abroad,"312
and even the N.S.A. recently backed out of meetings with a com-
mittee sent to Washington to learn more about the Echelon in-
terception system. 313
There would seem to be good reason, therefore, to call on Ger-
many and the United Kingdom to take their obligation under
305 Id. at 88-89.
306 Id. at 89.
307 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 89.
308 Id.
309 See id.
310 Id.
311 See id.
312 Id.
313 See Steve Kettmann, U.S. Echelon Snub Angers Europe, WIRED NEWS, May
18 2001, at http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,43921,00.html. For more
information regarding the European Echelon probe, see generally Declan McCul-
lah, Euros Continue Echelon Probe, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 24, 2001, at http:l!
www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,43270,00.html; Press Statement, Carlos
Coelho, Chairman of the European Parliament Temporary Committee on the Ech-
elon Interception System (May 10, 2001), at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/
2001/echelonstatement.htm.
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ECHR seriously and to make authorization of further intelligence
activities by N.S.A. on their territory contingent on compliance
with ECHR.314
4. U.S. Intelligence Gathering Activity: Conformity with the
ECHR
The covert interception of private communications in Eu-
rope by U.S. intelligence services can only be in conformity with
the ECHR if the following three requirements are met. First,
U.S. interference with private communications in Europe "may
only be carried out on the basis of legal rules which are gener-
ally accessible and whose implications for individuals are fore-
seeable."315 This requirement, however, "can be met only if the
U.S. discloses to the public in Europe how and under what cir-
cumstances intelligence-gathering is carried out."13 16 In addi-
tion, when U.S. regulations governing the interference with
private communications in Europe are incompatible with the
terms of the Convention, they "must be brought into line with
the level of protection provided in Europe."317
Second, U.S. interference "must be proportional, and
the least invasive methods must be chosen."318 Since only inter-
ference carried out by a European intelligence service can be
reviewed in the national courts, "operations constituting inter-
ference must be carried out, as far as possible, by the German or
U.K. authorities " 3 9 especially when surveillance activity is be-
ing carried out for law enforcement purposes. 320 Although the
U.S. has "repeatedly tried to justify the interception of telecom-
munications by accusing the European authorities of corruption
and taking bribes,"321 unless there is evidence of criminal
activity
the USA must leave the task of law enforcement to the host coun-
tries. If there is no such evidence, [the] surveillance must be re-
314 Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 89.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Id. at 90.
320 See Parliament Report on ECHELON, supra note 57, at 90.
321 Id. (citing James Woolsey, Why We Spy on Our Allies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17,
2000, at A14).
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garded as unproportional, a violation of human rights and thus
inadmissible. In other words, compliance with the ECHR can be
guaranteed only if the USA restricts itself to surveillance mea-
sures conducted for the purpose of safeguarding its national se-
curity, but not for law enforcement purposes.3 2 2
Lastly, "[ECHR] has stipulated that compliance with fun-
damental rights is contingent on the existence of adequate mon-
itoring systems and guarantees against abuse."323 The N.S.A.'s
utilization of the Echelon interception system from satellite re-
ceiving stations in EU Member States, therefore, can only be
consistent with the fundamental right to privacy in Europe "if
the USA introduces appropriate, checks on such operations car-
ried out for the purposes of safeguarding its national security or
if the N.S.A. makes its operations on European territory subject
to the authority of the control bodies set up by the host state,
i.e., Germany or the United Kingdom."324
VI. ANALYSIS
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the European Par-
liament has swept aside concerns about the Echelon intercep-
tion system, as well as the N.S.A.'s covert surveillance activities
in Europe.325 After a cursory debate, a British Labor Party
member justified the move, stating that there "is not enough
information on Echelon, beyond its existence, to debate the mat-
ter [more] fully."326 A Green Party member, however, "sug-
gested that the Parliament is reluctant to probe the matter
[more] fully for fear of jeopardizing relations between the EU
and the United States,"327 and that "they [simply] didn't want
to rock the boat."328 Nonetheless, civil rights groups view the
recent Echelon debate in the European Parliament as a major
victory that "fire[d] a warning shot across the bows of the
N.S.A."329
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 See Niall McKay, Did EU Scuttle Echelon Debate?, WIRED NEWS, July 19,
2002, at http://wired.com.news/politics/0,1283,15429,00.html.
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Id.
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Presently, Echelon's satellite receiving stations collect the
remnant wavelengths of global communications throughout the
world, and dictionary supercomputers instantly search the in-
tercepts for keywords that might provide the U.S. Intelligence
Community valuable COMINT. Echelon's interception capabili-
ties go far beyond traditional wiretapping techniques, however,
as the surveillance system allows the N.S.A. to intercept an
enormous number of private communications simultaneously.
Although Echelon's vast interception capabilities make it an ef-
fective tool in fighting the war against international terrorism,
its broad surveillance powers clearly infringe upon the funda-
mental right to privacy in Europe.
The U.S. Intelligence Community spends billions of dollars
for state-of-the-art communications technologies, but has never
confirmed the existence of Echelon. The European Parliament,
however, recently confirmed Echelon's existence as a global
system for the interception of private and commercial communi-
cations. Notwithstanding its interception capabilities, interna-
tional terrorist organizations can easily deceive Echelon's
supercomputers by crafting cryptic communications that do not
use traditional words of terror like 'bomb' and 'embassy' when
planning an attack. As a result, Echelon is not so much a con-
cern for international terrorists, but rather for the millions of
people throughout the world whose private communications are
routinely intercepted from the airwaves without warning.
Having already invested billions on Echelon, the N.S.A. will
undoubtedly continue to utilize its interception capabilities to
fight the war against international terrorism. Even after their
widely publicized failure to translate cryptic messages inter-
cepted on September 10, 2001, until the day after the attacks,
the N.S.A. remains hopeful that Echelon's interception capabili-
ties will help to prevent future terrorist attacks. Since the
N.S.A. cannot process, analyze, and disseminate sensitive
COMINT in real time, advanced international interception sys-
tems, such as Echelon, will continue to be unsuccessful in
preventing major terrorist attacks against our homeland.
VII. CONCLUSION
As a result of the tragic events which shook our nation on
September 11, 2001, the primary focus of the U.S. Intelligence
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Community will be on the collection, analysis, and dissemina-
tion of data concerning international terrorist organizations.
Toward that end, the USAPA now provides U.S. intelligence
services the wide-ranging surveillance powers required to effec-
tively fight the war against international terrorism. Since the
need for international cooperation among intelligence services
will be essential to winning the war against terrorism, the U.S.
will continue to work closely with its UKUSA partners around
the world.
The N.S.A. will continue to play a lead role in the global
hunt for international terrorists and will undoubtedly continue
to utilize Echelon to eavesdrop on global communications.
Wielding the new surveillance tools provided by the USAPA,
the N.S.A. will now bring its broad powers to bear on European
citizens from its interception stations throughout the world.
Even in the context of fighting the war against international
terrorism, the N.S.A.'s surveillance activities in Europe must be
subject to rigorous oversight, and guarantees must be provided
to safeguard against abuse. If the N.S.A.'s surveillance activi-
ties abroad continue to remain classified, and the circumstances
under which the U.S. can exercise surveillance on European cit-
izens are not made available to the public, then advanced inter-
national interception systems, such as Echelon, will continue to
infringe upon the fundamental right to privacy in Europe.
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